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ApathyApathy is a common but poorly understood condition with a wide societal impact observed in several
brain disorders as well as, to some extent, in the normal population. Hence the need for better character-
ization of the underlying mechanisms. The processes by which individuals decide to attribute physical
effort to obtain rewards might be particularly relevant to relate to apathy traits. Here, we designed
two paradigms to assess individual differences in physical effort production and effort-based decision-
making and their relation to apathy in healthy people. Apathy scores were measured using a modiﬁed
version of the Lille Apathy Rating Scale, suitable for use in a non-clinical population.
In the ﬁrst study, apathy scores were correlated with the degree to which stake (reward on offer) and
difﬁculty level impacts on physical effort production. Individuals with relatively high apathy traits
showed an increased modulation of effort while more motivated individuals generally exerted greater
force across different levels of stake. To clarify the underlying mechanisms for this behavior, we designed
a second task that allows independent titration of stake and effort levels for which subjects are willing to
engage in an effortful response to obtain a reward. Our results suggest that apathy traits in the normal
population are related to the way reward subjectively affects the estimation of effort costs, and more par-
ticularly manifest as decreased willingness to exert effort when rewards are small, or below threshold.
The tasks we introduce here may provide useful tools to further investigate apathy in clinical populations.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. General introduction milder form in healthy people, particularly in the elderlyApathy has been deﬁned as a loss of motivation characterized
by a quantitative reduction of self-generated voluntary and pur-
poseful behaviors (Levy and Dubois, 2006). It is frequently
observed across several neurological and psychiatric conditions,
including Parkinson’s disease (Pedersen et al., 2009), stroke
(Caeiro et al., 2013), Alzheimer’s disease (Robert et al., 2010), trau-
matic brain injury (Marin and Wilkosz, 2005), major depressive
disorder (Treadway and Zald, 2011) and schizophrenia (Foussias
et al., in press). Besides being common in many different clinical
populations, apathy is now also recognized to be widespread in(Brodaty et al., 2010; Clarke et al., 2010). But even in young people,
a motivation is an important factor that contributes to lack of suc-
cess in gaining employment (Vansteenkiste et al., 2004, 2005).
Apathy therefore has wide societal impact, both in health and
disease.
Despite being a common problem, apathy is an under-recog-
nized and relatively poorly understood syndrome. Although mech-
anisms responsible for apathy remain to be established, three
subtypes of disrupted processing have been proposed: emotional,
cognitive and behavioral (Stuss et al., 2000). Emotional apathy is
characterized by a lack of feeling, emotion or concern and a blunt-
ing of personality. Cognitive apathy relates to impaired elaboration
of plans for action. Behavioral apathy, also termed ‘auto-activation
deﬁcit’ by some authors, refers to diminished self-initiated actions,
lack of effort, decrease in productivity, or more generally a quanti-
tative reduction in self-generated voluntary behaviors (Marin and
Wilkosz, 2005). It often manifests as physical inertia, with require-
ment for prompts to initiate physical activity. In this article, we
focus on this particular domain of apathy.
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of effort and reward-based decision-making.
Objective external information on reward level offered and effort requirement are
weighed against each other to produce subjective values, which vary across
individuals. The output of this weighing process leads to the decision about
whether the reward is worth the effort cost, or not.
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to probe underlying mechanisms, some recent investigations have
demonstrated that insensitivity to rewards, abnormalities in esti-
mating the cost of effortful behavior, or disconnection of reward
evaluation from motor output, might be important components
of behavioral apathy in patients with focal lesions, e.g. stroke
affecting the basal ganglia (Schmidt et al., 2008; Adam et al.,
2013; Rochat et al., 2013), but also in patients with psychiatric dis-
orders (Gold et al., 2013; Treadway et al., 2012).
There is a general agreement that humans tend to avoid effortful
actions and, when given a choice, display a preference for strategies
that minimize effort (e.g. Friman and Poling, 1995; Kool et al., 2010;
Walton et al., 2006). Thus, when decidingwhether to take a particu-
lar course of action or not, people weigh the value of prospective
rewards against the amount of effort that is required to attain them
(Bijleveld et al., 2012). Rewards which require less effort to obtain
are preferred over the same value rewards requiring greater effort
for receipt. That is, behavior is driven by the net-value (beneﬁts
minus costs) of rewards (Bijleveld et al., 2012; Botvinick et al.,
2009; Kivetz, 2003). This has been referred to as effort discounting.
As far as we are aware, this principle has not been investigated
speciﬁcally in the context of apathy, but some researchers have
proposed that excessive effort discounting might be a key compo-
nent of this condition (Kurniawan et al., 2010). That is, individuals
with behavioral apathy might be highly sensitive to action costs,
assessing many activities to be too effortful and thus not worth
performing or engaging in. Therefore, studies that investigate
cost-beneﬁt decision-making have the potential to provide valu-
able insights into mechanisms underlying behavioral apathy.
There have been several methodological developments in terms
of how physical effort discounting is assessed (e.g. Gold et al.,
2013; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Treadway et al., 2009). For instance,
Pessiglione and colleagues (Schmidt et al., 2008) developed a par-
adigm where participants are presented with different monetary
incentives (stakes) and have to respond by squeezing a hand grip,
knowing that the proportion of the monetary stake they will obtain
depends upon the force they exert. On this task, patients with apa-
thy following lesions of the basal ganglia showed less response
force modulation in response to the different incentives offered,
but preserved valuation modulation (increased ‘liking’ from low
to high incentives as measured by skin conductance) (Schmidt
et al., 2008).
In the ﬁrst study presented here, we used a similar task with
additional manipulations to further investigate how effort exertion
is modulated in response to an incentive but also to other external
factors such as the level of difﬁculty and visual feedback of
response. These additions allow investigation of other important
aspects of apathy, namely sensitivity to effort requirement and
Self-Awareness of performance via feedback. Our objective was
to examine how these manipulations affect motivation, and more
particularly, how they vary in relation to apathy traits in the
healthy population.
Although this approach constitutes a very useful way to inves-
tigate aspects of physical effort production in relation to apathy,
there might be other means by which to explore underlying deci-
sion-making mechanisms. At least three processes might be
involved before the decision to exert effort for a reward is made
(Fig. 1):
(1) Reward sensitivity: howmotivation is modulated by a change
of reward, regardless of effort requirement.
(2) Effort sensitivity: howmotivation is affected by an increase in
effort requirement, regardless of reward at stake.
(3) Subjective effort discounting: how effort costs are weighed
against reward value to compute a subjective value for a
given action.We therefore designed a second task to investigate how these
three processes might relate to behavioral apathy across healthy
individuals. This task allowed titration, for each individual, of an
‘Indifference Point’ (IP) for each reward magnitude – the effort
which an individual would be willing to make to obtain the reward
on 50% of occasions when offered that reward. A similar approach
has been used in the temporal discounting literature to relate the
characteristics of indifference functions to impulsivity traits
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). With this design, we were able to
investigate how participants’ choices to engage in an effortful
response are inﬂuenced by rewards at stake (reward sensitivity)
or effort requirements (effort sensitivity). In addition, we were able
to characterize the way effort cost is subjectively weighed against
reward, with the estimation of IPs.
Speciﬁc hypotheses and methods for each of the studies out-
lined are presented in Sections 3 and 4 respectively, after the
description of the Methods that are common to both.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The study was approved by Oxford University Medical Sciences
Inter Divisional Research Ethic Committee. All subjects volun-
teered for the study via a website and gave informed written con-
sent before the study. Fifty neurologically healthy participants,
with no current diagnosis of psychiatric disorder were recruited
for study 1, and thirty were recruited for study 2. The two studies
lasted 90 min. Participants were told that the money they would
receive at the end of the experiment would depend on their task
performance and would vary between £8 and 12.2.2. Questionnaires
2.2.1. Apathy questionnaire
The Lille Apathy Rating Scale (LARS) (Sockeel et al., 2006) is a
semi-structured interview assessing clinically relevant levels of
apathy along several domains reﬂecting the distinct components
of apathy (emotional, cognitive and behavioral). Concurrent valid-
ity has been assessed in relation to the Apathy Evaluation Scale
(Marin et al., 1991), with correlations of r = 0.87 between global
18 V. Bonnelle et al. / Journal of Physiology - Paris 109 (2015) 16–26scores suggesting high concurrent validity, and with reference to
expert clinician categorization of syndrome severity. Moreover,
the LARS has been shown to assess apathy symptoms indepen-
dently of depression (Sockeel et al., 2006).
However, some of the questions would not be appropriate for
healthy participants. We therefore modiﬁed the original question-
naire to produce an extended version (LARS-e), a 51-item question-
naire, which like the original LARS, assesses four domains of
apathy, with each domain consisting of subscales relevant to dis-
tinct features of apathy:
 Action Initiation (AI) comprises two subscales, everyday pro-
ductivity and initiative. It mostly refers to physical aspects of
apathy and can therefore be used as an index of behavioral
apathy.
 Intellectual Curiosity (IC) comprises four subscales, interest,
novelty seeking, motivation and social life. It mostly refers to
intellectual aspects of apathy and can be used as an index of
cognitive apathy.
 Emotional Responsiveness (ER) has only one subscale that can
be used as an index of emotional apathy.
 Apathy is often associated with low Self-Awareness (SA), it is
therefore a relevant additional axis to index.
A copy of the LARS-e questionnaire can be viewed in Supple-
mentary material.
Here, we used the combined LARS-e scores as a general index of
apathy traits (with low scores associated with greater apathy), and
the AI domain scores as a speciﬁc index of behavioral apathy.
In adapting the LARS to create the LARS-e we were motivated to
retain the original apathy construct but to increase sensitivity to
subtle differences in levels of apathy in moderately impaired and
healthy populations. In the current study, participants provided
self-report responses.
The original yes/no response format was replaced with a four-
response option Likert scale (1–4) in order to extend the operating
range of the instrument, 1 corresponding to extremely apathetic
and 5 extremely motivated. In a pilot study, we found that overall
scores on the LARS-e were correlated (r = 0.654, p < 0.01) with
scores on the Apathy Scale (Starkstein et al., 1992); for all subscalesFig. 2. Experimental task used in Study 1. Participants were presented with a monetary
cue (Easy or Difﬁcult) was presented. (A) Trial in which difﬁculty cue is presented with
presented with no visual feedback of response (red bar full throughout). The order of stak
with the presentation of a vertical bar on one side of the screen and participants had to sq
half of the trials, response feedback was provided, in the form of a red level indicatingexcept Self-Awareness, subscale scores on the original LARS and
LARS-e were also signiﬁcantly correlated (r > 0.4, p < 0.05). All sub-
scales apart from the Self-Awareness one had a reasonable index of
reliability (see Supplementary information for more details).
2.2.2. Depression questionnaire
The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales (DASS) (Lovibond and
Lovibond, 1995), a questionnaire developed in a non-clinical pop-
ulation, was used to measure depression. The questionnaire con-
sists of 42 items divided into three subscales assessing
depression, anxiety, or stress. Each of the three subscales contains
14 items that are scored on a four-point Likert scale.
2.2.3. Anhedonia questionnaire
The Snaith–Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith et al., 1995) was
used to measure anhedonia. This 14-item questionnaire is scored
on a four-point scale.
A factor analysis was performed to investigate whether apathy
scores relate to depression or anhedonia (see SI Section 1.2 and
Table S1). To summarize the main ﬁndings, while the three other
components of the LARS-e appear partially related to anhedonia,
AI does not. As we discuss later, this might be an important disso-
ciation to bear in mind when examining components of apathy
and/or anhedonia.
2.3. Apparatus
Stimulus presentation was programmed in MATLAB (The Math-
Works Inc., USA) using the Psychtoolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org).
Force was recorded using a TSD121B-MRI hand dynamometer
(BIOPAC Systems Inc., USA) with a sample rate of 500 Hz
(Fig. 2C). The recorded signal was digitalized and fed in real-time
into the PC running the task program.
2.4. Estimation of Maximal Voluntary Contraction (MVC)
The two tasks were calibrated using individuals’ Maximum
Voluntary Contraction (MVC). At the beginning of the experimental
session, participants were asked to squeeze the handles as strongly
as they could with their right and left hands. The maximum forcereward cue (£1 or 10 pence – £0.1 – coin) and on two third of trials a difﬁculty level
visual feedback of response (level of red bar). (B) Trial where only stake value is
e and difﬁculty cues was counterbalanced across trials. The response period started
ueeze the corresponding handgrip (C) to win a percentage of the money at stake. On
the percentage of the stake that can be won with the current force exerted.
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to try to squeeze each handle until the level indicating their force
online went above a yellow bar, corresponding to 100% of the max-
imum force previously recorded for the same hand. If they man-
aged to reach that level, the procedure was repeated using the
new maximum, else the ﬁrst value was kept. The procedure was
repeated three times and the maximal force reached was used as
the MVC for that participant.Fig. 3. Effect of stake, difﬁculty and response feedback on force exerted (index of
motivation). Average response force, expressed as percentage of Maximum
Voluntary Contraction (MVC) are plotted for the different stakes (£0.1 and £1)
and the different difﬁculty levels (easy in green, difﬁcult in red), for trials were
response feedback was provided (solid lines) or not (dotted lines). Error bars
represent standard errors.3. Study 1: modulation of effort production by stake, difﬁculty
and response feedback
3.1. Objectives and hypotheses
The aim of Study 1 was to examine how three factors – reward
magnitude, effort requirement, and the presence of performance
feedback (online visual feedback of the amount of force produced)
– relate to apathy traits in a sample of the healthy population. For
this, we developed an experimental task adapted from Schmidt
et al. (2008), which required participants to effortfully squeeze a
handgrip in order to win monetary incentives. We hypothesized
that high apathy traits would be associated with less intrinsic
motivation and more behavioral inertia, which would in turn man-
ifest as lower response force exertion, especially under more chal-
lenging conditions such as high difﬁculty level or absence of visual
feedback, and/or lower motivation for rewards, perhaps due to a
higher reward sensitivity threshold.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Participants
Fifty neurologically healthy participants (18 males, 32 females)
aged 18–65 (mean age 29.5 ± 12.6) were recruited for this study.
3.2.2. Task description
The experimental task manipulated stake magnitude, difﬁculty
level and online visual presentation of the force applied during
the response, or ‘response feedback’ (Fig. 2). A total of 288 trials
were grouped into six blocks, each lasting approximately ﬁve min-
utes. Between each block, participants were given time to rest or
ﬁll in the questionnaires (LARS-e, DASS and SHAPS). The money
participants received at the end of the experiment was equal to
the cumulative total won in one of the six blocks (selected by
chance with a dice), and was typically between £8 and 12.
Each trial began with the presentation of either a monetary
incentive or level of stake (10 pence (£0.1) or £1 coin) or a difﬁculty
level cue (easy, difﬁcult or no cue) indicating how hard it would be
to win a percentage of the monetary stake (Fig. 2A). The formula
for computing reward was the following:
Reward ¼ Reward Gain Stake ðResponse Force=MVCÞ
where reward gain was 0.7 for easy trials and 0.3 for difﬁcult trials
and MVC is the Maximum Voluntary Contraction (see Section 2.4
above).
The order of the stake and difﬁculty cues was counterbalanced
across trials. Each cue was presented for 1.5 s.
On one third of the trials, only the monetary incentive was
shown (Fig. 2B). These trials still had different difﬁculty levels,
but participants could only ﬁnd out the trial difﬁculty level while
responding (if response feedback was on) or at the end of the trial
during the reward feedback period (if response feedback was off).
After cue presentation, the response period started with the
appearance of a vertical bar on the left or the right of the screen,
prompting participants to start responding with the corresponding
hand (Fig. 2A and B). The response period lasted 3 s. The harder theparticipants squeezed the hand dynamometer (Fig. 2C), the more
money they earned.
In trials where visual response feedback was provided
(Response feedback ‘ON’), the vertical bar ﬁlled in red according
to the force exerted. If participants exerted their Maximal Volun-
tary Contraction (MVC), the red level would rise up to 70% of
the box on easy trials, or 30% on difﬁcult trials. In trials in which
visual response feedback was not provided (Response feedback
‘OFF’), the bar appeared immediately entirely ﬁlled in red
(Fig. 2B). At the end of the trial, participants were shown how
much money they won in that particular trial and how much they
had gained in total.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Stake, difﬁculty and response feedback inﬂuence effort
production
A 2  2  2 ANOVA was used to analyze the effects of stake
(£0.1 or £1), difﬁculty (easy or difﬁcult) and response feedback
(‘ON’ or ‘OFF’) on response force. Participants exerted signiﬁcantly
more effort on trials when £1 was at stake, compared to trials
where maximum reward was £0.1 (F(1, 49) = 34.17, p < .001). In
addition, they produced signiﬁcantly higher response forces on
easy trials, compared to difﬁcult trials (F(1, 49) = 14.41, p < .001).
Participants also exerted more effort when they could see online
visual feedback (Response feedback ‘ON’) of their response force
compared to trials where no feedback was provided (F(1,
49) = 111.68, p < 0.0005).
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between stake and difﬁculty
cues (F(1, 49) = 8.501, p = 0.005), driven by the difﬁculty cue pro-
ducing more effort modulation for the higher stake (Fig. 3). Thus
participants were more motivated to exert a greater force for
higher stakes when the trial was an easy one. Additional effects
related to the difﬁculty cues are presented in Supplementary
Materials.
In addition, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between the
three task manipulations (stake  difﬁculty level  response feed-
back, F(1,49) = 11.52, p = 0.001). This was driven by the fact that
the stake  difﬁculty interaction mentioned above was observed
only when the response feedback was on (Fig. 3), suggesting that
during the response phase feedback ampliﬁes the motivational
impact of the cues (presented prior to response).
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The self-rating scores obtained with the LARS-e (see Section 2)
were used to correlate apathy traits with behavioral effects on the
task. The combined LARS-e scores were used as an index of general
apathy traits (low scores mean more apathy), and the AI domain
scores as a speciﬁc index of behavioral apathy.
3.3.2.1. Overall response force. As hypothesized, subjects with
higher apathy traits (lower LARS-e scores) exerted signiﬁcantly less
effort on average, as demonstrated by a positive correlation
between the overall LARS-e score and mean response force across
all trials (spearman rs = 0.32, p = 0.024) (Fig. 4). A partial correla-
tion controlling for depression and anhedonia conﬁrmed the spec-
iﬁcity of the relationship between LARS-e scores and overall
response force (r = 0.393, p = 0.008), so that individuals who are
in general more apathetic respond overall less strongly.
3.3.2.2. Modulation of effort with incentive (stake) and difﬁculty. We
next investigated in more detail the relation between apathy traits
and the effects of stake and difﬁculty cues on modulation of effort.
Overall LARS-e scores were signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with
the Stake effect – deﬁned as percentage change in force exerted for
£1 vs. for £0.1 (rs = 0.302, p = 0.033). Thus, more apathetic people
(low LARS-e scores) showed greater percentage increase in force
for £1 vs. £0.1 than more motivated individuals. LARS-e scores
were also signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the Difﬁculty
effect – deﬁned as percentage change in force exerted for ‘Easy’
vs. for ‘Difﬁcult’ trials (rs = 0.316, p = .031). More apathetic people
showed greater percentage increase in force on ‘Easy’ compared to
‘Difﬁcult’ trials than more motivated individuals. Both relation-
ships remained signiﬁcant after controlling for depression or anhe-
donia, using partial correlations (Stake effect: r = 0.344, p = 0.024;
Difﬁculty effect: r = 0.354, p = 0.020). These ﬁndings show that
individuals with higher apathy traits (lower LARS-e scores) modu-
lated their response forcemore according to cues related to reward
and difﬁculty level relative to more motivated participants.
To investigate more speciﬁcally the relation with behavioral
apathy traits, we examined the relationships between stake and
Difﬁculty effect and the AI subscale of the LARS-e. AI scores corre-
lated with the stake effect (rs = 0.296, p = 0.037, Fig. 5A), and the
Difﬁculty effect (rs = 0.400, p = 0.005) (Fig. 5B), suggesting that,
although the overall response force does not seem to be related to
behavioral apathy traits, the modulation of response force is.
As for the overall LARS-e scores, both correlations remained sig-
niﬁcant when controlling for depression and anhedonia (Stake
effect: r = 0.393, p = 0.006; Difﬁculty effect: r = 0.442, p =
0.005). In addition, these effects were not confounded by otherFig. 4. Relation between LARS-e scores and task performance. Relationship
between LARS-e scores (higher scores =more motivated individuals) and mean of
overall response force, expressed as percentage of MVC, across all trials.apathy domains. Indeed, partial correlations with AI controlling
for ER, IC and SA scores remained signiﬁcant (Stake effect:
r = 0.310, p = 0.043; Difﬁculty effect: r = 0.400, p = 0.008).
To further investigate the relation between behavioral apathy
traits and the changes in motivation associated with rewards at
stake or difﬁculty level, we split participants into two groups with
high and low AI scores using a median split and performed a
group  stake  difﬁculty ANOVA. There was a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between group  stake  difﬁculty (F = 3.97, p = 0.05) (Fig. 6),
which was driven by the fact that the high apathy group responded
less vigorously for the least motivating condition (low stake, high
difﬁculty).
More details on the relationship between apathy traits and the
difﬁculty cues effects are presented in Supplementary
Information.3.3.2.3. Modulation of effort with response feedback. There was no
signiﬁcant correlation between LARS-e (r = 0.199, p = 0.166) or
AI scores (p = 0.941) and modulation of effort production by
response feedback.
Importantly, none of the behavioral effects nor the overall
response force correlated with depression (overall response:
p > 0.9, Stake effect: p > 0.8, Difﬁculty effect: p > 0.8, Feedback
effect: p = 0.15) or anhedonia (overall response: p > 0.6, Stake
effect: p > 0.5, Difﬁculty effect: p > 0.5, Feedback effect: p = 0.19)
questionnaires scores, conﬁrming that the experimental task was
purely related to apathy and not to depression or anhedonia.3.4. Conclusion
The results of this study demonstrated that motivation (here
indexed by willingness to exert physical force) can be up-regu-
lated by increasing the reward at stake or decreasing the level
of difﬁculty to be expected (Fig. 3). In addition, motivation can
be decreased during the response execution period, by not pro-
viding on-line visual feedback of the force exerted (Fig. 3). Impor-
tantly, individual differences in some of these behavioral effects
are related to self-reported apathetic traits (Figs. 4 and 5) as
indexed using the LARS-e. Individuals with more pronounced
behavioral apathy traits were more sensitive to reward and difﬁ-
culty, but not to response feedback (Figs. 4 and 5), as shown by
a steeper modulation or response force from one condition to
the other.
Three distinct processes could account for these observations:
(i) Increased motivational threshold for reward: behavioral
apathy might be associated with having a higher threshold
for reward magnitude that is considered worth making an
effortful response for, resulting in weaker responses for
low rewards but similar responses for high enough
reward.
(ii) Increased effort sensitivity: While all people are generally
disposed to avoid effortful actions (e.g. Friman and Poling,
1995; Kurniawan et al., 2011), apathetic individuals’ low
willingness to incur costs might in part be driven by placing
abnormally large emphasis on action costs.
(iii) Change in activation threshold after reward and effort costs
have been subjectively combined to guide behavior: apa-
thetic people might rely on an aberrant cost-beneﬁt valua-
tion system.
As a next step, we designed a study that permits investigation of
these processes, to investigate which of these relate to apathy
traits.
Fig. 5. Relation between behavioral apathy and task performance. (A) Correlation between Action Initiation subscale of the LARS-e and effect of stake on change of response
force (percentage change from £0.1 to £1) and (B) effect of difﬁculty on change of response force (percentage change from difﬁcult to easy trials).
Fig. 6. High and low behavioral apathy group comparison Average response force,
expressed as percentage of Maximum Voluntary Contraction (MVC) are plotted for
the different stakes (£0.1 and £1) and the different difﬁculty levels (easy: solid line,
difﬁcult: dotted line), for participants with high (orange) and low (cyan) Action
Initiation scores (lower scores mean more behavioral apathy). Error bars represent
standard errors.
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discounting
4.1. Objectives
In Study 1, apathy traits were found to be related to the level of
physical effort individuals have to exert in more difﬁcult, and less
rewarding conditions. However, it is unclear whether this is due to
a difference in sensitivity to stake or effort, or alternatively in the
way these two factors inﬂuence each other, e.g. in the way stake
is subjectively devalued under more effortful conditions (Fig. 1).
Therefore, we next investigated more speciﬁcally the processes
underlying effort-based decision making, using a new task that
allows us to deﬁne more precisely under what circumstances a
subject decides an action is no longer worth pursuing.
In this experiment, participants are offered, on a trial-by-trial
basis, different magnitudes of stake for different levels of effort.
Using an adaptive staircase procedure we were able to compute,
for each subject, individual ‘Indifference Points’ (IP) – the point
at which participants decide on 50% of occasions that they are will-
ing to exert a certain force (as a percentage of MVC) for a particular
stake. Our modeling of choices provided an estimate of partici-
pants’ sensitivity to reward and effort, as well as measures of thecharacteristics of subject-speciﬁc effort-cost functions. We then
examined how these measures related to individual differences
in apathy traits.
4.2. Methods
4.2.1. Participants
Thirty participants were recruited for this study via a local
advertising website (mean age 25.3 ± 4.2, range 18–34, 13 males).
4.2.2. Task description
This paradigm focused on the effort and reward based decision-
making process taking place before engaging in a physically effort-
ful response. As with the previous task, we wanted to keep the cog-
nitive demands to a minimum, so that it would not be a
confounding factor in our analysis of the relationship between task
behavior and apathy traits. We also tried to make the task more
engaging and easy to translate into a ‘real-life’ situation.
Each trial started with the presentation of an apple tree that
combined information about the stake (number of apples) and
the effort level required to win a fraction of this stake (trunk
height) (Fig. 7). There were six possible stakes (1, 3 6, 9, 12 and
15 apples), and six possible effort levels (60%, 70%, 80%, 90%,
100%, 110% of subject’s MVC), indicated by yellow horizontal lines
on the tree trunk. The highest level (110% MVC) was of course not
reachable, but was added nonetheless to control the number of
effortful responses in the case some individuals would always
agree to respond to the 100% MVC effort level trials (see staircase
procedure below). Trials where the effort level was 110% of the
MVC were not included in the analysis.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were trained
on these different levels so that they knew the physical effort level
each yellow line corresponded to when they started the task. In
addition, although participants were not explicitly told so, the ﬁrst
block was considered as training and not included in the analysis.
Direct visual feedback of the amount of effort exerted in relation to
the level required to obtain the reward was provided by a red bar
that ﬁlled the trunk as participants squeezed the handgrip device
(see Fig. 7).
On each trial, participants had to decide whether or not they
wanted to engage in an effortful response to win a percentage of
the presented stake. They selected a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ option by gently
squeezing one of the handle corresponding to the location of the
option on the screen. If the combination [stake/effort level] was
judged ‘not worth it’, they chose the ‘no’ option and the trial ended.
Fig. 7. Adaptive effort discounting task. Trials start with the presentation of an apple tree for 1.5 s. The number of apples in the tree represents the stake while the effort level
is indicated by the trunk size and the level highlighted in yellow on the scale. This is followed by the presentation of the yes/no option at the bottom of the screen. Subjects
can select the option corresponding to their choice by gently squeezing the correct response device. If the yes option is selected, the same tree reappears on the right or the
left of the screen and participants have 3 s to squeeze using the corresponding hand. Subjects only win a percentage of the stake if they manage to reach or go beyond the top
of the trunk. If the no option is selected, the next trial starts with the presentation of another tree (i.e. another offer with a different combination of stake and effort required to
obtain it).
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peared on the left or the right of the screen, indicating which hand
should be used for the execution of the effortful response. The par-
ticipant then had three seconds to squeeze the handgrip in order to
move the red bar above the top of the trunk (Fig. 7). If the top of the
trunk was not reached within the response window, no apple was
gathered.
The number of apples gathered (and therefore the reward accu-
mulated) was otherwise estimated as follow:
Reward ¼ ½Stake  ðMaxForce=MVCÞ  ðEffort level 0:3Þð Þ
MaxForce corresponds to the maximum force reached over the
3 s response period. Participants were instructed to gather as
many apples as they wanted over the course of the experiment,
knowing that the money they would receive at the end would
depend on the total number of apples gathered during the exper-
iment (minimum: £8, maximum: £12). To reduce fatigue effects,
blocks were interleaved with questionnaires: LARS-e, DASS and
SHAPS.
The MVC for each hand was initially estimated as explained
previously in the Section 2. However, to account for potential fati-
gue effects over time, the MVC was adjusted on each block so that
it corresponded to 95% of the maximum force reached over theprevious block. In addition, if a force higher than MVC was pro-
duced, the MVC would be set to this new value on subsequent
trials.4.2.3. Adaptive algorithm
Importantly, the combinations of stake and effort levels on each
trial were not presented at random. Instead, we used an adaptive
algorithm so that the trees presented on a given trial depended
on participant’s previous choices. If a combination was refused
on one trial, then on a subsequent trial, the stake would increase,
or the effort level would decrease (stake and effort were adjusted
alternatively). The opposite would happen if a combination was
accepted. We used three different staircases randomly interleaved
across trials so that participants would not be aware of the
procedure.
The use of an adaptive algorithm had several advantages: First,
it allowed repeated sampling along subjects’ speciﬁc Indifference
Points functions, which separate the stake/effort space into a
‘worth it’ and a ‘not worth it’ zone. This provided a better charac-
terization of these functions while reducing experiment duration
and fatigue. Second, it allowed for control of the number of effort-
ful responses so that overall, every participant would accept to
engage in an effortful response on 50% of trials.
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4.3.1. Estimation of Indifference Points
For each stake magnitude we estimated the effort level
(expressed as %MVC) a subject was willing to exert on 50% of occa-
sions, i.e. the effort Indifference Point (IP). Conversely, we also esti-
mated for each effort level, the stake a subject was likely to accept
on 50% of offers: the Stake IP. A two-step analysis was performed
based on each individual’s choices. For this, we ﬁrst ﬁtted a logisticFig. 8. Estimation of stake and effort Indifference Points A. Probability of agreeing to enga
function of stake level for each different effort levels, represented in different colors (6
Probability of making a ‘yes’ choice as a function of effort levels for each different stake,
show an example from one participant of the probabilities of ‘yes’ choices, ﬁtted with logi
to the points for which the choice probability function is equal to 0.5 (i.e. 50% chance to r
based on choice probability functions for the different stakes. Note that some Indifference
reaches 0.5.function to the choice probability data for each effort level – or
each stake magnitude – separately. An example of the ﬁtted prob-
ability functions for one subject is shown in Fig. 8C and D. The
probability of agreeing to engage in a response (‘yes’ option
selected) was plotted as a function of stake levels for the six differ-
ent effort levels (Fig. 8C), and as a function of effort levels for the
six different stakes (Fig. 8D). We also plotted the average of the ﬁts
across all participants (Fig. 8A and B). These functions then allowed
estimation of effort – or stake – IPs, corresponding to the effort (orge in an effortful response (‘yes’ choice) averaged across all participants plotted as a
0–110% of Maximum Voluntary Contraction (MVC) shown in different colors). (B)
represented in different colors (1–15 apples) across all participants. Panels C and D
stic functions. E. For each Effort level, plot of Stake Indifference Points corresponding
espond yes). (F) Similarly, Effort Indifference Points are plotted for each stake levels
Points cannot be estimated, as the corresponding choice probability function never
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The IPs obtained in this way were plotted against their correspond-
ing stakes magnitude or effort levels (Fig. 8E and F).
Overall, across the sample, increasing the stake increased the
level of effort people were willing to engage to win a percentage
of this stake (ANOVA main effect of stake level on Effort IP:
p < 0.0005, Fig. 8F). Similarly, increasing effort requirements
increased the stake for which participants were willing to engage
(ANOVA main effect of effort level on Stake IP: p < 0.0005, Fig. 8E).
It could be argued that choices are not necessarily based on
effort and stake, but rather on effort and potential outcome (i.e.
reward that can be obtained). In our task, reward depends on per-
formance, but it can be estimated by calculating, on each trial, the
reward that could be won if participant’s maximal force were pro-
duced (i.e., if force exerted = MVC). These reward estimates were
then binned into six levels to mimic the six stake levels (see
Table 1).
The same procedure as explained previously was then used to
estimate effort IPs for the different reward levels. As previously,
when averaging the IPs across subjects, we observed a signiﬁcant
increase in the effort level subjects were willing to exert with
increases in reward (ANOVA main effect of reward level on Effort
IP: p < 0.0005, main effect of effort level on Reward IP:
p < 0.0005). As would be expected, rewards for which a higher level
of effort had to be produced were less desirable than when the
effort requirement was low.
A limitation of this IP estimation approach is that IPs cannot
always be estimated for every stake or reward level (and recipro-
cally), as illustrated in Fig. 8F. Indeed, for a given stake, the proba-
bility to accept responding may be consistently above or below 0.5.
As a consequence, in certain subjects, only two IPs could be esti-
mated, limiting the accurate characterization of the IP function.
To estimate the characteristics of IP functions, we therefore opted
for another approach consisting of directly modeling choice prob-
abilities as a function of reward and effort, and inferring the IP
function characteristics based on subject-speciﬁc parameters esti-
mated with this model.4.3.2. Choice probability modeling
Because we were particularly interested in investigating the
independent impacts of reward and effort on choice as well as
the way they interact, we entered these two variables in a simple
logistic regression model of choice probability:
PðyesÞ ¼ ð1þ expðbrew  rewardþ beff  effortþ b0ÞÞ1
P(yes) corresponds to the probability to agree to engage in an
effortful response. The sensitivity to reward and effort (i.e. the
impact they have on choices) are reﬂected by the subject speciﬁc
parameters given as beta values brew and beff respectively. The
parameter b0 represent the choice bias toward the selection of
the ‘no’ option, regardless of effort and reward (more bias resulting
in a right shift of the sigmoid). On average across participants,
reward had a weight on choice of 1.4 ± 0.6 (negative beta weightTable 1
Reward estimate levels for each stake and effort combination.
Stake (apple #) Effort levels (MVC fraction)
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1
6 3 2 2 2 1
9 4 3 3 2 2
12 5 4 3 3 2
15 6 5 4 3 3value means inﬂuence toward ‘yes’, one-sample t-test: t = 13.08,
df = 29, p < 0.0005), effort had a weight of 0.6 ± 0.7 (t = 4.39,
df = 29, p < 0.0005), and the response bias was 2.39 ± 0.60
(t = 3.96, df = 29, p < 0.0005).
4.3.3. Indifference Lines characteristics
Subject-speciﬁc characteristics of the Indifference Lines (IL)
separating the ‘not worth it’ from the ‘worth it’ space could be esti-
mated based on the parameters of the choice model:
Effort IL ¼ ðbrew=beffÞ  reward b0=beff
Reward IL ¼ ðbeff=brewÞ  effort b0=brew
The means of these function characteristics (slope and inter-
cept) across all participants are presented in Table 2.
The slope of the Effort IL reﬂects how much reward inﬂuences
the subjective cost associated with effort. For instance, if the Effort
IL slope is steep, this means that the subjective experience of effort
is strongly associated with the reward value. Similarly, the slope of
the Reward IL reﬂects the way effort requirement affects the sub-
jective value associated with a reward. The Effort IL intercept
reﬂects the spontaneous level of effort people are willing to engage
for the smallest possible reward; while the Reward IL intercept cor-
responds to the minimal reward subjects are ready to engage in
when effort requirement is minimal.
4.3.4. Relation with apathy traits
Next, we examined how the model parameters related to apa-
thy scores on the LARS-e (overall LARS-e scores and AI subscale).
4.3.4.1. Apathy and sensitivity to reward or effort. No signiﬁcant cor-
relation was observed between either LARS-e or AI scores and the
impact of reward or effort on choice (the beta values brew and beff),
or with the response bias parameter b0 (all p values for spearman
correlations superior to 0.45). Thus apathy did not appear to be
related to sensitivity to reward or effort cost across our cohort.
4.3.4.2. Apathy scores are related to effort Indifference Line charac-
teristics. Recall that Effort IL intercept gives the spontaneous level
of effort people are willing to engage for the smallest possible
reward, while Effort IL slope indexes how much reward inﬂuences
the subjective cost associated with effort. LARS-e scores were sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with Effort IL intercepts (r = 0.469, p = 0.024;
Bonferroni corrected), and more marginally with Effort IL slope
(r = 0.385, p = 0.086; Bonferroni corrected). The Action Initiation
(AI) component was also strongly correlated with the characteris-
tics of the Effort IL (Correlation Ai-Effort IL intercept: r = 0.574,
p = 0.004, Fig. 9A; AI-Effort IL slope, r = 0.473, p = 0.044, Fig. 9B;
Bonferroni corrected).
However, intercepts and slopes were highly correlated
(r = 0.858). We therefore examined in more detail their relation-
ship with AI scores using partial correlations controlling for their
respective variance. AI remained signiﬁcantly correlated with
Effort IL intercept while controlling for the slope (r = 0.419,
p = 0.029), but the correlation between AI and Effort IL slope was
no longer signiﬁcant when controlling for the variance explained
by the intercept (p = 0.51).
Importantly, the correlation between AI and Effort IL intercept
remained when controlling for the other apathy subscales as well
as depression and anhedonia (partial correlation r = 0.608,
p = 0.002). This means that in individuals with higher apathy traits
(particularly behavioral apathy) subjective effort costs for the
smallest rewards were higher than in more motivated subjects
(lower and negative intercept).
To further investigate how good the characteristics of the Effort
IL are at classifying between high and low behavioral apathy we
Table 2
Effort and reward Indifference Lines characteristics.
Effort IL slope (brew/beff2) Effort IL intercept (b02/beff2) Reward IL slope (beff2/brew) Reward IL intercept (b02/brew)
2.14 ± 3.53 2.60 ± 7.78 0.44 ± 0.48 0.95 ± 1.92
Fig. 9. Correlations between Action Initiation scores and Effort Indifference Line characteristics. (A) Correlation with the intercept: more apathetic individuals (low AI scores)
have lower intercept, which reﬂects a higher subjective estimation of effort cost for small rewards. (B) Correlation with the slope: more apathetic individuals have a steeper
slope, which reﬂects a higher impact of reward on subjective effort costs.
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the AI subscale scores of the LARS-e obtained across Experiments
1 and 2 (N = 80). The mean of the distribution was 3.56, with a
95% conﬁdence interval between 3.44 and 3.69. All participants
with AI scores below the lower bound of this conﬁdence interval
were classiﬁed in the ‘high apathy’ group (N = 12), and those with
scores higher than the upper bound were classiﬁed as being in the
‘low apathy’ group (N = 13).
The three model parameters (b02, brew, beff) and four IL charac-
teristics for effort and reward (Effort IL slope, Effort IL intersect,
Reward IL slope, Reward IL intersect) were added in a stepwise bin-
ary logistic regression analysis aimed at classifying subjects into
those with high or low apathy. Only Effort IL intercept was selected
(Chi-square = 9.12, df = 1, p = 0.003) in a model that could correctly
classify the subjects with 80.0 % of accuracy (66.7% for the low AI
group and 92.3% for the high AI group). This analysis conﬁrms that
the subjective effort cost ‘baseline’ (or intercept), which reﬂects
how willing an individual is to engage effort when the reward is
at its lowest, can be used to distinguish between subjects with high
and low behavioral apathy traits.
The relationships between personality traits and Effort IL char-
acteristics appeared to be speciﬁc to behavioral apathy, indexed by
the AI subscale. There was no signiﬁcant correlation with the other
components of the LARS-e: Intellectual Curiosity (p > 0.44), Emo-
tional Responsiveness (p > 0.46) and Self-Awareness (p > 0.46),
depression (p > 0.5) and anhedonia (p > 0.69).
4.4. Conclusion
This new paradigm allows investigation of behavioral mecha-
nisms underlying apathy traits in the healthy population. In
healthy individuals with relatively high behavioral apathy traits,
larger rewards are needed to initiate an effortful behavioral
response. Using this measure of effort cost ‘baseline’, it was possi-
ble to classify participants into those with high or low apathy traits
with 80% of accuracy, suggesting a potential for the use of this task
as a tool to characterize apathy traits behaviorally, rather than
with self-reports.5. Discussion
In study 1, we observed that individuals with high behavioral
apathy traits, as indexed by the Action Initiation (AI) subscale of
the LARS-e, were more sensitive to stake and difﬁculty level (Figs. 4
and 5). This was mostly driven by the fact that less motivated indi-
viduals engaged less physical effort in response to least motivating
conditions, but were prepared to exert similar effort as more moti-
vated individuals for the high reward or easy conditions (Fig. 6).
This could be due to differences in the absolute impact of effort
level and reward on behavior (before reward/effort weighing),
and/or differences in the subjective valuation of reward and effort
cost relative to each other.
In order to clarify which of these behavioral mechanisms under-
lie apathy traits, we designed a second task to investigate physical
effort and reward-based decision-making. Participants’ choices
were modeled as a function of effort level and potential reward
(Fig. 8). Our results suggest that apathy traits in the normal popu-
lation are related to the way reward subjectively affects the estima-
tion of effort costs, and more particularly manifest as decreased
willingness to exert effort when rewards are small, or below
threshold (smaller Effort IL intercept, Fig. 9).
Investigating apathy in a way that is not confounded by other
cognitive factors is particularly critical in patients with neurologi-
cal disorders, and requires a task that minimizes cognitive load,
such as the one employed here. In most existing tasks designed
to investigate effort discounting, participants have to choose
between two options. For instance, a recent study investigating
physical effort discounting used a task similar to ours, with the dif-
ference that participants have to choose between a no effort/low
reward option and high efforts/high rewards options (Hartmann
et al., 2013). Participants thus have to weigh reward against effort
requirement in the effortful option, and then compare the subjec-
tive output of this weighing to the ﬁxed option. In our task, partic-
ipants simply had to decide whether or not they want to engage in
a response given a particular combination of effort requirement
and reward magnitude. This more simple approach requires less
information processing, perhaps reducing potential confounds,
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neurological or psychiatric disorders.
For the same reasons, a design such as the one we have intro-
duced here might also be more efﬁcient in investigating the neural
basis of reward and effort-based decision-making in a neuroimag-
ing setting, without the extra level of complexity produced by the
comparison between the two options. Finally, one could argue that
this type of accept/reject choice is more ecological than two-
options choice. In real life, we are more often confronted by situa-
tions where we have to decide whether or not to engage in an
action given a particular outcome and effort requirement, rather
than situations where we have to decide between two actions with
different rewards and effort requirement.
Here, we also introduced an extended version of the Lille
Apathy Rating Scale (LARS-e) suitable for use in the normal popu-
lation. One of the advantages of this apathy scale is that it provides
separate measures of the three main apathy domains: emotional,
cognitive and behavioral. Using this scale, we could therefore focus
on the behavioral domain of apathy and control for the eventual
effects related to other domains. This form of apathy is particularly
frequent in patients with neurological disorders (van Reekum et al.,
2005,Levy and Dubois, 2006), and is considered to be the most
severe form of apathy ( Levy and Dubois, 2006). The term ‘auto-
activation deﬁcit’ has been coined to describe this syndrome,
which is particularly prominent in patients with lesions of the
basal ganglia, including Parkinson’s disease (Levy and Dubois,
2006).
A key challenge for future research will be to extend our task to
disorders marked by prominent behavioral apathy. It may be that
clinical groups exhibit a distinctly different pattern of motivational
deﬁcits (cf. Schmidt et al., 2008) to the ones we observed in the
healthy population. However, our observations appear to echo
some of the previously described characteristics of auto-activation
deﬁcit: behavioral inertia that is reversed by strong enough exter-
nal incentives, or solicitors (Levy and Dubois, 2006).
In this study, we developed two tasks to investigate the behav-
ioral mechanisms underlying apathy. The work we present here
relates to the healthy population. It remains to be seen whether
these principles might also be usefully extended to apathy in clin-
ical populations where the syndrome is increasingly recognized to
have an important functional and economic cost. The second task
offers a particularly promising means to investigate further the
neural basis for effort and reward based decision-making and
how this may relate to individuals apathy traits.
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